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Currency Blocs in the 21
st Century 
“Perhaps the most underrated determinant and measure 
of international currency status ... is the ‘anchor currency’ (peg) function.” 
Papaioannou and Portes (2010) 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, economists and politicians have started to discuss whether another 
currency will one day be able to rival the dominant international role of the US dollar. 
Portes and Rey (1998) were among the first to predict that the dollar would “face stiff 
competition” once the euro was created. More recently, Eichengreen (2011) expects a 
system of multiple international currencies, in which “the dollar, the euro, and the 
renminbi will be the leading international currencies” (p 151). Chinn and Frankel (2007, 
2008) estimate that the euro may surpass the dollar as the leading reserve currency in a 
few years. Focusing more on their role as anchor currencies, Posen (2008, 2009) doubts 
that the euro will be able to attain a status comparable to that of the US dollar. 
Turning from the future to the present, the current world economy is shaped by 
two major currency blocs which coexist with numerous floating currencies. The present 
study analyses this state of the world along three sets of questions: (1) What are the 
characteristics of the present currency blocs? (2) How do long-term structural variables 
affect an economy’s anchor currency choice? Which distinctive features of the US 
dollar bloc and the euro bloc can be inferred from the analysis? (3) What might a 
currency bloc equilibrium based on the above analysis be like? How would currently 
discussed currency regime-related policy decisions affect this equilibrium? 
The first part of the paper deals with question (1). All the countries and territories 
of the world are classified according to their exchange rate regime and anchor currency 
choice. The classification is used to give a precise overview of the current extensiveness 
of the two major currency blocs. 
In a second step, the influence of long-term structural economic variables on 
exchange rate regime and anchor currency choice is estimated. This part of the analysis 
relates to the empirical optimum currency area (OCA) literature surveyed, for instance, 
by Klein and Shambaugh (2010) and von Hagen and Zhou (2007). Most earlier studies, 
however, differ from the present one in that they usually focus on currency regime   2
choices, do not distinguish between different anchor currencies, and, therefore, say 
nothing about the determinants of currency bloc affiliation. In this literature, anchor 
currency choice has attracted surprisingly little attention. As an exception, Meissner and 
Oomes (2009) explicitly consider anchor currency choice but their sample ends in 1998, 
the year before the euro was introduced. Since then, the situation has changed 
fundamentally because, now, there are two major currency blocs instead of just one. A 
further contribution made by this part of the paper is methodological: The anchor 
currency choice options are conditional on a decision on an exchange rate peg in the 
first place. This obvious nesting structure of the modelled decision suggests using a 
nested logit approach for estimation. The approach allows us to isolate factors that 
distinguish countries which peg to the US dollar from euro bloc countries. 
Estimation results show that OCA criteria and related structural variables are 
significant determinants of countries’ currency regime and anchor currency choices. 
Moreover, the estimated model is found to be consistent with an additive random utility 
model (ARUM) interpretation. This implies that countries choose the regime that 
provides the highest utility, while the utility functions depend additively on the 
explanatory variables. For a few countries, however, the estimated high utility of the 
chosen regime is due to a large error term, and the structural explanatory variables may 
suggest that a change in the currency regime significantly increases their estimated 
utility. 
The consequences of this result are explored further in part three of the study. 
Adopting an equilibrium definition from Alesina and Barro (2002), a currency bloc 
equilibrium is derived empirically. Similar to Alesina et al (2002), the estimated 
optimal currency regime and anchor currency choice is determined for each country. 
The present study goes beyond Alesina et al (2002), however, in that the optimal anchor 
currency choice is derived from estimated utilities that, in turn, reflect the total 
influence of all currency regime determinants. The computed currency bloc equilibrium 
is subsequently used as a baseline scenario for an analysis of the effects of a number of 
economic policy decisions. The policy shocks include the adoption of a euro peg by 
some European Union countries which currently allow their currencies to float vis-à-vis 
the euro, and the termination of the use of the US dollar as an invoice currency for oil   3
exports. A final exercise assesses the renminbi’s potential for becoming the core of a 
third currency bloc. 
The next chapter deals with classification issues and includes a description of the 
two currency blocs. Chapter 3 details the econometric approach. Chapter 4 explains the 
explanatory variables used in the estimation, the results of which are presented in 
chapter 5. Currency bloc equilibria are computed and discussed in Chapter 6, which also 
includes counterfactual analyses of policy decisions. Chapter 7 concludes. 
2. Currency blocs since the introduction of the euro – a descriptive 
overview 
2.1 Currency regime classification 
For an investigation of currency blocs, it is important to define carefully the limits 
of each bloc. This basically amounts to choosing a suitable exchange rate classification 
scheme. Since the study aims to explain the present pattern of currency bloc 
composition and to provide an outlook for the near future, the classification scheme 
needs to be up to date. In order to be representative, the scheme needs, further, to 
include all the countries in the world. Since the authorities’ declarations may differ from 
their real intentions or economic necessities, as is reported, for example, by Calvo and 
Reinhart (2002), a de facto classification is appropriate. However, the authorities’ 
effective decisions should play a role, since they are modelled as being a reaction to the 
structure of their countries’ economy. 
A classification scheme that fulfils the above requirements to a large degree is the 
IMF’s de facto classification of exchange rate arrangements.
1 Starting with the 1999 
volume, the IMF’s “Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions” contains information on de facto exchange rate regimes rather than de jure 
exchange rate regimes, as published earlier. As outlined in the compilation guide 
chapter of these reports, countries are required to notify their exchange rate regime to 
the IMF. If this de jure regime is empirically confirmed over at least six months, the de 
jure classification is adopted in the de facto classification; otherwise, the regime is 
reclassified according to the empirical results. Concerning anchor currency choice, the 
                                                 
1 Apart from the IMF’s exchange rate classification scheme, alternative schemes have been developed, 
notably by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), Shambaugh (2004), 
and, more recently, Dubas, Lee and Mark (2010).   4
IMF approach’s inherent check of whether the officially proclaimed or unofficially 
notified  de jure exchange rate regime has been applied de facto is advantageous 
because, otherwise, it may be hard to identify, in particular, currency baskets that are 
used as anchors. 
Since the primary objective of the study is an investigation into currency bloc 
composition, the classification of exchange rate regimes has been confined just to the 
two coarse categories “peg” and “float” without further specifying the type of the 
regime. Borderline cases such as crawling pegs, crawling bands
2 or regimes of the 
IMF’s residual category “other managed arrangements” have been assigned to the 
category of floating exchange rates in order not to contaminate the modelling of the 
anchor currency decision and because, in such cases, it is unclear whether the 
authorities are really willing to bind their own monetary policy to the anchor country 
authorities’ decisions. Because of the present dominance of the US dollar and the euro 
as anchor currencies, all the remaining pegs, including those to currency baskets, have 
been combined in the residual category “peg to another currency”. This leaves a 
classification into the four categories: floating exchange rate, peg to the US dollar, peg 
to the euro, and peg to some other currency. 
The IMF’s data have been complemented by information taken from the Deutsche 
Bundesbank’s monthly publication “Exchange Rate Statistics, Statistical Supplement to 
the Monthly Report 5”. The Table in Appendix 1 displays the resulting classification for 
each country and territory in the world since 1999. The observation period has been 
chosen to start in 1999 because this was the year in which the euro, the core currency of 
the euro bloc, was introduced and when popular discussions on an end to the “unipolar” 
global exchange rate system centred around the US dollar gradually began to emerge. 
2.2 The two major currency blocs in 2008 
The Table in Appendix 1 reveals that only 26 out of 229 countries and territories 
chose a peg to a currency basket or to a currency other than the US dollar or the euro in 
2008. While the countries that peg to a currency basket include some middle-income 
                                                 
2 As an example, consider the Chinese renminbi during the episode of gradual appreciation vis-à-vis the 
US dollar in 2006 and 2007, which might be classified as crawling peg or band.   5
countries, notably Libya, Morocco and Syria, the large majority of the countries in this 
category are small countries, microstates or dependent territories. 
In contrast, the US dollar bloc and the euro bloc each comprised 56 countries and 
territories in 2008.
3 The maps in Figures 1 to 3 show the geographic distribution of 
countries and territories belonging to either of the two major currency blocs in this year. 
US dollar bloc members are displayed in green and euro bloc members in blue. The 
maps show that, apart from the USA, the US dollar bloc comprises, first, many smaller 
countries and territories of Central America, the West Indies and the northern part of 
South America; second, there is a cluster of mostly oil-exporting countries in the 
Arabian peninsula and Central Asia; third, some present and former tiny dependencies 
of the USA in the Pacific also belong to the US dollar bloc; and fourth, a small group of 
other countries limits the flexibility of their currencies vis-à-vis the US dollar. Some of 
them, like Angola or Ecuador, are oil exporters; others are very small, but the most 
important of all dollar peggers in economic terms, China, also belongs to this group. 
It may be instructive to note that, apart from China (including Hong Kong and 
Macao), none of the East and Southeast Asian emerging markets peg their currencies to 
the US dollar. Foreign exchange market interventions to smooth fluctuations vis-à-vis 
the dollar are, however, widespread among these countries.
4 Moreover, there is no 
longer any European country that limits the flexibility of its currency against the US 
dollar. Most recently, Belarus and the Ukraine abandoned their dollar pegs during the 
financial crisis. Apart from some oil exporters, finally, there is hardly any country in 
South America or Africa that belongs to the US dollar bloc in 2008. 
The euro bloc is obviously concentrated on Europe and includes, naturally 
enough, European Monetary Union members, countries that participate in the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism II, some Balkan countries and European microstates. A second group 
of euro bloc members are former and current French, Portuguese, Spanish and Danish 
dependent territories, mainly in Africa. 
                                                 
3 Eichengreen (2011, p 125) reports a relation of “54 countries pegged to the U.S. dollar, compared to just 
27 to the euro”, but he will certainly have ignored, inter alia, the euro area countries in his count. 
4 Cobham (2008) finds, accordingly, for 1999-2007 that the currencies of several of these countries, while 
not being pegged to the dollar, are relatively more aligned to the US dollar than to the euro.   6
While the number of countries and territories in the US dollar and the euro 
currency blocs is the same, the US dollar bloc is larger when measured in economic 
terms; expressed in 2005 constant purchasing power parity units as provided by the 
World Bank, the combined GDP of the US dollar bloc was 189% of the corresponding 
euro bloc value in 1999 and 209% in 2008. These figures need, of course, to take into 
account the fact that, unlike the euro bloc, the US dollar bloc is dominated by two 
economies, the USA and China, which together make up between 83% of the US dollar 
bloc’s GDP in 1999 and 90% in 2008. In 2006 and 2007, when the authorities in China 
were pursuing an appreciation policy against the US dollar and China was classified as 
having a floating exchange rate regime, the combined US dollar bloc’s GDP 
consequently fell to 160% and 150% of the euro bloc’s value, respectively. 
The Table in Appendix 1 allows us to take a closer look at the evolution of the 
two major currency blocs in the decade prior to 2008. It turns out that the euro bloc was 
extremely stable compared with the US dollar bloc. The only countries that left the euro 
bloc between 1999 and 2008 were Hungary and Croatia. In contrast, 33 countries from 
all over the world left the US dollar bloc at least once during this period. The large 
number of exits from a dollar peg, however, does not imply that there was a decline in 
the number of countries limiting the flexibility of their currency vis-à-vis the US dollar; 
instead, the number of dollar bloc countries and territories even increased slightly 
compared with 1999. 
3. Econometric approach 
Given the classification into the four categories described in the previous chapter, 
the consideration of whether to join (or leave) a currency bloc needs to be taken within a 
framework as shown in Figure  4. This involves two interrelated issues: First, the 
decision on a specific currency regime and, second, given that a peg has been chosen, 
the decision on a specific anchor currency. The issue of anchor currency choice arises 
only conditional on a decision on a limit to exchange rate flexibility. 
A proper estimation method for cases where decisions have a clear nesting 
structure, like the one in Figure 4, is the nested logit, which goes back to McFadden 
(1978, 1981). It differs from a simple multinomial logit in that, here, the multinomial 
logit’s assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives is relaxed. While a   7
multinomial logit would treat the residuals of the random utility from all the four 
alternatives as being independent of each other, the nested logit allows them to be 
correlated. 
Assume that all the regressors vary across countries but not across alternatives and 
that a flexible exchange rate (alternative 4) is the base category for currency regime 
choice, the first-level decision. Denote the probabilities p of country i (i = 1, … , N) 
choosing a pegged (P) or a floating (F) exchange rate as piP and piF = 1 – piP, 
respectively. Assume, further, that the option to choose an anchor currency other than 
the US dollar or the euro is the base category for anchor currency choice, the second- 
level decision. Given that country i decides to peg its exchange rate, denote the 
probabilities of choosing the euro as anchor currency (alternative 1), the US dollar 
(alternative 2), or some other currency (alternative 3), as pi1|P,  pi2|P, and 
pi3|P = 1 – pi1|P – pi2|P. Then, the overall probabilities of country i choosing one of the 
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where  = =
4
1 1
j ij p  for each i, z is a vector of explanatory variables for the first-level 
decision, currency regime choice, α is the corresponding parameter vector, x1 and x2 are 
two vectors of explanatory variables for the second-level decision, anchor currency 
choice, x1 (x2) determining the choice of a peg to the euro (the US dollar) over a peg to 
some other currency, β1 and β2 denote the corresponding parameter vectors, τ is the 
dissimilarity parameter for the fixed exchange rate options defined as  ρ τ − = 1 , and ρ   8
is the correlation coefficient between the residuals of the random utility from the three 
options that involve a currency peg (cf equation (7) below); finally, I denotes the 
inclusive value of choosing a peg, 
  () () [] τ τ / exp / exp 1 ln 2 2 1 1 β x β x ′ + ′ + = I . (5) 
A FIML approach can be used to estimate the nested logit. Define four binary 
variables, yij (j = 1, ... , 4), for each country i such that yij = 1 if alternative j is chosen 
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with respect to α, β1, β2 and τ. 
A sufficient condition for the nested logit model to be consistent with an additive 
random utility model (ARUM) interpretation is 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 (cf Börsch-Supan, 1987, p 49). 
In this case, country i’s utility of choosing alternative j is given by 
  ij ij ij V U ε + =  (7) 
where εij is an iid error and Vij is the deterministic component of country i’s utility. In 
the present setting, the deterministic component of utility from choosing a floating 
exchange rate is normalized to zero, Vi4 = 0.  For  the  three  options that involve a 
currency peg, 
  1 1β x α z ′ + ′ = 1 i V , (8) 
  2 2β x α z ′ + ′ = 2 i V  (9) 
and 
  α z′ = 3 i V . (10) 
In an ARUM framework, the chosen alternative j is that with the highest utility 
Uij; however, the high utility of alternative j, Uij, can simply be due to a large error εij 
while deterministic utility of another alternative k, Vik, may be larger than Vij. In such a 
case, it may be desirable to test whether the deterministic utility Vik of regime k is 
significantly larger than the deterministic utility Vij of regime j that country i has   9
chosen, ie whether the estimated model would suggest a change in the exchange rate 
regime or the anchor currency for country i. A Wald test statistic for 
  H0:  0 ˆ ˆ = − ij ik V V  (11) 
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() ′ ′ ′ ′ = τ 2 1 β β α θ  and Σ ˆ  denotes the estimated covariance matrix of θ. 
4. Explanatory variables 
An estimation of the econometric model (1) to (6) requires a set of explanatory 
variables for the first-level decision on currency regime choice, the vector z, and a set of 
explanatory variables for the second-level decision on anchor currency choice, the 
vectors x1 and x2. The objective of the econometric model is to investigate the effects of 
the fundamental long-term structural determinants of anchor currency choice. This 
suggests considering, in particular, variables which are related to optimum currency 
area (OCA) theory.
5 OCA theory, which goes back to the seminal works of Mundell 
(1961) and McKinnon (1963), has been explored in several empirical studies on 
exchange rate regime choice. Overviews of this literature, which examines variables 
                                                 
5 In studies such as Poirson (2001), Juhn and Mauro (2002) and von Hagen and Zhou (2007), the list of 
explanatory variables is extended beyond OCA criteria also to include political factors and variables 
related to the importance of real versus nominal shocks. These variables cannot contribute, however, to 
an explanation of anchor currency choice. Moreover, Levy-Yeyati et al (2010) have demonstrated the 
exclusive relevance of OCA criteria for the regime choice of both industrialized and non-industrial 
countries. Finally, we follow Alesina et al (2002) in ignoring variables related to financial markets and 
Klein and Shambaugh (2010, p 87) in ignoring macroeconomic variables such as inflation or the 
volatility of the real exchange rate that could be highly endogenous to the exchange rate regime choice.   10
that may be included in vector z, is given inter alia by Klein and Shambaugh (2010) as 
well as von Hagen and Zhou (2007). A recent study by Meissner and Oomes (2009) 
specifically considers determinants of anchor currency choice in the era prior to the 
introduction of the euro, ie variables that may be included in vectors x1 and x2. 
Considering first the determinants of currency regime choice (vector z), the most 
famous insight of OCA theory is that a high degree of international economic 
integration in goods and factor markets reduces the costs of limiting exchange rate 
flexibility and raises a peg’s benefits. An often-used explanatory variable in this context 
is (the log of) real GDP expressed in purchasing power parities.
6 There is less of a 
necessity for large economies to engage in trade in order to obtain goods. Moreover, the 
scope for an independent monetary policy is often very limited for small economies, so 
that for them the opportunity costs of a peg are low. Therefore, optimum currency 
theory would suggest that a higher real GDP reduces the utility from a peg in equations 
(8) to (10), which amounts to a negative sign of the corresponding α parameter.
7 
Another OCA hypothesis first put forward by Kenen (1969) is that the gains from 
a peg are relatively high for a country whose production and/or consumption is highly 
diversified. A variable that may be used to approximate the degree of product 
differentiation within an economy is (the log of) real per capita GDP expressed in 
purchasing power parities. Consumption will be clearly more differentiated in richer 
economies; while this may also be true of production, some oil-exporting economies, at 
least, will deviate from the rule. As shown below, the analysis controls for such cases. 
In sum, the hypothesis suggests a positive α coefficient. 
Two further variables have been used in robustness checks not shown in the 
paper: trade openness (the ratio of imports plus exports per GDP) has been added as a 
more specific measure of a country’s general international trade integration. Since the 
estimated parameters were always insignificant, openness has been dropped from the 
baseline specification. As an alternative to real GDP, population has been used in some 
                                                 
6 A description of data sources for the explanatory variables is given in Appendix 2. 
7 Note that the sign of the α coefficients is equal to that of the corresponding marginal effects because the 
first decision level (peg versus float) of the nested logit has just two alternatives. The same is true of all 
the β1 and β2 coefficients of those variables that enter either vector x1 or vector x2 but not both.   11
specifications. The results were always virtually identical to those with real GDP, and 
are therefore not reported. 
Turning to the determinants of anchor currency choice (vectors x1 and x2), the 
complement to general trade openness is trade integration within a currency bloc. While 
trade integration affects the suitability for entering a peg in general, trade integration 
within a given bloc determines the appropriateness of pegging to a currency of this 
specific bloc. Meissner and Oomes (2009) identify this variable as a central determinant 
of anchor currency choice in the post Bretton Woods era. It is important to note that it is 
not simply trade with the country that issues the anchor currency but trade with all the 
bloc members that is expected to govern anchor currency decisions. 
Trade integration with a given currency bloc is measured as trade of country i at 
time t with all the (other) countries that belong to the bloc at time t as a fraction of 
country i’s total trade. Given the data on anchor currency choice at time t, on exports X 
to all destination countries k and on imports M from all origin countries k, the trade 
share S of country i with the US dollar (USD) bloc at time t is computed as 
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and the trade share with the euro bloc analogously. For each country, such trade shares 
have been computed for both blocs for each of the years 1999 to 2008. The trade share 
for the euro bloc is included in vector x1 and the trade share for the dollar bloc in vector 
x2. This implies, as equations (8) and (9) show, that the trade share for the euro bloc 
affects the country’s utility from choosing a euro peg in comparison with a peg to a 
currency other than the euro or the US dollar (but not the utility from choosing a dollar 
peg), while the trade share for the dollar bloc affects only the country’s utility from 
choosing a US dollar peg. In both cases, theory would suggest a positive coefficient. 
The issue of potential endogeneity is dealt with in section 5.4. 
The log of great circle distance between a given country’s capital and the location 
of the central monetary policy authority of each currency bloc is used as a second 
determinant of anchor currency choice. For several reasons, it is to be expected that a 
small distance raises the relative utility from pegging a currency to the corresponding   12
bloc’s anchor currency. First, a small distance implies low transportation costs and thus 
raises the potential for trade.
8 Second, a small distance is favourable to a high degree of 
factor, especially labour, mobility between two locations and thus comes close to 
reflecting Mundell’s (1961) original idea. Third, co-movements of business cycles, an 
important factor in models such as that of Alesina and Barro (2002), will probably be 
more symmetric in economies which are located close to each other. Fourth, 
consumption patterns will probably be more similar in nearby countries, a property 
which, according to Corsetti (2010), is also conducive to a peg. Fifth, neighbouring 
populations may also have similar preferences concerning the conduct of monetary 
policy, a criterion for the desirability of a fixed exchange rate which has been proposed 
by Haberler (1970). Cultural proximity, for instance a common language, finally 
supports several of the above criteria. For all these reason, log distance to Frankfurt has 
been included in vector x1 and log distance to Washington, DC, in vector x2. Both 
coefficients should be negative. 
A further potential determinant of anchor currency choice is the percentage of net 
oil exports in total exports. Since oil is invoiced in US dollars, a dollar peg would 
stabilize export, and thus public, revenues of oil exporters. This variable may also serve 
as a control for the caveat mentioned when dealing with per capita GDP. It is important 
to use net oil exports because this excludes countries like Singapore – which do not 
pump oil but have large capacities for refining it – from being treated as oil exporters. 
This variable is set to zero for all net oil importers. It is included in both x1 and x2 
because a high percentage of net oil exports might be expected to increase the 
probability of choosing a dollar peg while decreasing the probability of choosing a euro 
peg. 
As a final explanatory variable, a colony dummy has been used. The dummy is set 
to one if the country or territory in question is currently or has been governed by one of 
the euro bloc countries.
9 Colonial relations from the period before 1960 are ignored. 
Klein and Shambaugh (2010) suggest that former colonial ruler countries may maintain 
                                                 
8 Therefore, the distance variable is, of course, negatively correlated with the corresponding trade share 
variable. However, the correlation coefficients in our sample are always far from being seriously close 
to -1. 
9 A similar dummy variable has been constructed for the US dollar bloc. However, all the former and 
present US colonies drop out of the sample because of a lack of data on some other explanatory 
variable.   13
ties with their former colonies by providing them with foreign aid that could mitigate 
business cycles. According to Kenen (1969), such a fiscal transfer system reduces the 
disutility from binding monetary policy to a foreign authority. Another reason for 
former colonies to maintain such a peg could be a strategy to attract tourism from the 
former colonial ruler country, where often the same language is spoken. The dummy 
which enters vector x1 is accordingly expected to have a positive β coefficient. 
The estimated probabilities merely reflect the structural suitability of a country for 
choosing a specific exchange rate regime and/or currency anchor. Even if a country is 
found to fundamentally derive a high utility from pegging to a given anchor currency, 
this does not guarantee a successful maintenance of the peg. As a minimum 
requirement, the country additionally needs to pursue monetary, fiscal, and wage 
policies which are adequate for the peg. 
5. Results 
5.1 Estimation results for coefficients of the baseline specification 
The econometric model (1) to (6) can be estimated either cross-sectionally for 
each year separately or as a pool. However, the gain in information from pooling the 
data will probably be rather small because most of the independent variables as well as 
the dependent one do not vary much over time, if at all. In Table 1, estimation results 
for the coefficients of both cross-section and pooled estimations are shown. In the 
pooled estimation, robust standard errors have been obtained by clustering observations 
by countries. The cross-sectional view is focused on the first and the last years of the 
sample, 1999 and 2008, respectively. Results for the other years are shown in 
Appendix 3. In a non-linear model like the present one, the sample averages of the 
marginal effects may be more instructive than the coefficient estimates, especially 
concerning their economic significance. These marginal effects of each variable on each 
alternative are therefore presented in Table 2.
10 
Tables  1 and 2 show that the selected explanatory variables, which are 
predominantly related to classical OCA criteria, contribute significantly to explaining 
                                                 
10 Limited data availability for the explanatory variables restricts the sample to 157 to 167 countries per 
year. Apart from Hong Kong, no other dependent territories are included. The USA and Germany, as 
the base countries for the US dollar bloc and the euro bloc, respectively, are also left out of the sample.   14
exchange rate regime and anchor currency choice. The signs of all the effects 
correspond to their expected values. The probability of choosing a fixed exchange rate 
is low if a country’s real GDP is relatively high, and it is high if the country is relatively 
rich in terms of real GDP per capita. Given that a country decides on a peg, the 
probability of choosing the euro as anchor currency increases if a country trades 
extensively with euro bloc members and it decreases with the distance of the country’s 
capital to the location of the European Monetary Union’s central bank, Frankfurt am 
Main. Analogously, having a large trade share with members of the dollar bloc raises a 
country’s probability of belonging to the bloc itself, and being located far from 
Washington, DC, reduces this probability. Finally, being a present or former colony of 
one of the euro bloc members considerably raises the probability of using the euro as 
anchor currency. 
Most of the coefficients are highly significant. An exception to this is the 
coefficient for the distance to Washington, DC, whose sign coincides with theoretical 
predictions in each of the regressions, but it is weakly significant at best (in the years 
2000, 2002 and 2003). This suggests that the US dollar is used as an anchor currency on 
a global scale, while the euro is more of regional importance as anchor currency. On the 
face of it, this supports similar observations mentioned in various issues of the ECB’s 
annual publication “The international role of the euro”. However, the result needs to be 
qualified to some degree, as will be seen in section 5.3. 
The other variable whose statistical significance is doubtful is the share of net oil 
exports in total exports. Since this variable is included as a regressor in both the euro 
and the US dollar peg equations, the isolated consideration of each of the two 
coefficients might not reflect the variable’s importance. Therefore, a Wald test on the 
equality of the two estimated parameters has been performed (cf Table 1). The equality 
hypothesis is weakly rejected in the 1999 and 2008 regressions, but cannot be rejected 
in the pooled regression. Although the probability of choosing the US dollar as anchor 
currency is generally found to rise and that of the euro to fall if oil accounts for a larger 
percentage of a country’s net exports (cf Table  2), the validity of the relationship 
remains largely unconfirmed. This is consistent with the results of Rafiq (2011), who 
shows that the benefits of a dollar peg for oil-exporting economies are doubtful, because 
the peg does not insulate them from terms-of-trade shocks.   15
The dissimilarity parameter τ is estimated to lie in the range of 0.2 (in 2002) and 
0.5 (in 2008). Likelihood ratio tests always firmly reject the hypothesis that τ equals 1. 
This implies that a simple multinomial logit approach without any nesting structure 
would have been inappropriate, and the use of the current nested logit structure is 
confirmed. The fact that τ always lies in the interval [0; 1] implies, moreover, that the 
currently observed pattern of exchange rate regime and anchor currency choice can be 
interpreted as an outcome of an additive random utility maximisation on the part of the 
countries in the sample where the utility functions are defined as in (7) to (10) and 
Vi4 = 0. 
5.2 The distribution of the estimated probabilities and implications for the 
exchange rate regime choice of selected countries 
Figures  5 and 6 give an impression of the distribution of the estimated 
probabilities of choosing currency regime options. Figure 5 relates to the most recent, 
2008 regression. Figure 6 also depicts the result for the most recent observation for each 
country, again mostly that of 2008, but is based on the regression that uses pooled data 
for 1999-2008. In both figures, each point represents one country, and its location in the 
large triangle reflects the combined estimated probabilities of choosing a dollar peg, a 
euro peg or a regime of floating exchange rates. If estimation results suggest a 100% 
probability of choosing a float, the point is located at the top corner of the triangle; if 
the probability of choosing a US dollar (euro) peg is 100%, the point is located at the 
lower left-hand side (right-hand side) corner of the triangle.
11 More precisely, assume 
that each of the three corners of the equilateral large triangle is located at a unit distance 
from the triangle’s geometric centre. Then, the coordinates of a point for country i are 
given by 
  () () ( )() [] 6 sin ˆ ˆ ˆ ; 6 cos ˆ ˆ 2 1 4 2 1 π π ⋅ + − ⋅ − i i i i i p p p p p , (16) 
                                                 
11 The two figures ignore one of the regime options of our classification: the peg to a currency other than 
the US dollar and the euro and the corresponding probabilities pi3. The reason for the exclusion of this 
alternative is that, being a base category for the peg regimes, it has not been explicitly modelled. A peg 
to the South African rand, for instance, should include at least the distance to Pretoria and the share of 
trade with South Africa as explanatory variables. Since there are very few observations for such a peg, 
this is obviously not possible. For the countries that peg to a currency basket, which are also assigned 
to category 3, another problem arises: Their basket usually includes a significant amount of US dollars 
and euros, which the analysis has not been accounted for either. Thus, the estimated probabilities for 
this category will not be particularly meaningful, and are therefore discarded from the figures.   16
where pij is given by equations (1), (2), and (4). The shape and colour of the points 
indicate the currently chosen regimes: a brown dot for a float, a green triangle for a peg 
to the US dollar, and a blue diamond for a peg to the euro. In an ideal world, the brown 
dots should therefore be located near the top corner of the large triangle, the small green 
triangles near the lower left-hand side corner, and the blue diamonds near the lower 
right-hand side corner. 
Considering the distribution of probabilities, there are (1) countries that are 
estimated to belong quite unambiguously to one of the currency blocs or to the “float 
corner” and (2) countries whose probabilities of choosing either one of the two pegs or a 
floating exchange rate regime are quite similar. The lack of points in the lower central 
part of the large triangle implies, however, that, once a country decides on a regime of 
fixed exchange rates, the estimated model leaves hardly any uncertainty about the 
question of which anchor currency the country should choose. 
Comparing the model’s predicted regime choice with the one which is actually 
observed, the figures suggest that most countries have chosen the predicted currency 
regime. However, there are some countries for which this is obviously not true. How 
should these cases be interpreted? While the admissibility of an ARUM interpretation 
(cf chapter 5.1) suggests that the country’s exchange rate regime and anchor currency 
choice is based on a rational utility-maximising decision, the random utility from that 
choice is composed of two parts: first, deterministic utility that is explained by the 
regressors of the model and, second, an error term. Large errors can occur when 
important explanatory variables have been ignored. If this is not the case, they may, 
however, indicate that the countries in question have failed to choose the optimal 
exchange rate regime. 
In order to focus on the relevant cases, a Wald test as described in equations (11) 
to (14) has been used to determine whether the estimated deterministic utility of an 
alternative regime is significantly larger than the corresponding utility of the regime that   17
is actually chosen.
12 The countries for which such a result has been found are indicated 
by their ISO codes in Figures 5 and 6; the ISO codes are tabulated in Appendix 1. 
First, there is a group of countries that currently allow their exchange rates to 
float, for which a peg to the euro would, however, significantly increase their estimated 
utility. These countries are Switzerland, Iceland (a country that has been considering 
introducing the euro for some years now), the Czech Republic (being an EU member, it 
is expected to introduce the euro as soon as it fulfils the relevant criteria), Croatia 
(already temporarily classified as having a euro peg in 2007), Albania and, according to 
the pooled regression, also Sweden, another EU member. Moreover, the 2008 (but not 
the pooled) regression suggests a euro peg for Algeria and Suriname. In these two cases, 
however, the estimated high utility of choosing a euro peg is due, in particular, to the 
fact that they used to be colonies of France and the Netherlands, respectively. This 
appears to be a variable for which the possible benefits of a peg discussed in chapter 4 
may accrue especially unevenly across countries. 
Given the recent friction in the European Monetary Union (EMU), it may be 
noted that, according to the estimates, none of the EMU member states would 
significantly increase its utility by leaving the union. While unsustainable fiscal and 
wage policies have obviously contributed to problems such as the high sovereign debt 
yields of countries like Greece, Ireland or Portugal, the fundamental structure of their 
economies is not at odds with these countries’ general decision to use the single 
currency. 
The 2008 regression does not yield cases where a country that is not part of the 
US dollar bloc is estimated to significantly gain utility from joining the bloc, but the 
pooled regression does: the Seychelles, Jamaica (one of the very few countries in the 
West Indies that is not part of the bloc yet), Canada and Singapore. The list of countries 
still supports Alesina et al’s (2002) findings according to which “... Latin American 
countries are by no means a clear dollarization bloc”. Posen’s (2008, 2009) claim that 
the US dollar’s importance as anchor currency is evidenced by the fact that several 
countries which should obviously join the euro bloc refrain from doing so is 
                                                 
12 Instead of using the estimated deterministic utilities, the Wald test can also be applied to determine 
whether the estimated probabilities differ significantly. The relevant results, which are provided on 
request, mostly do not differ from those presented here.   18
corroborated by the present results for the euro bloc. While the 2008 regression results 
for the dollar bloc also confirm Posen, the panel results suggest that the dollar bloc does 
not differ from the euro bloc in this respect; the latter results are therefore inconsistent 
with Posen’s argument. 
Finally, there is a group of mostly US dollar bloc countries that – according to 
either the 2008 or the pooled estimation results or both – would gain significantly from 
letting their currencies float. These are Zimbabwe,
13 Malawi, China, Bangladesh, 
Yemen, Turkmenistan, Jordan, Chad, Kazakhstan and the Lebanon. Because of the 
USA’s long-standing efforts to convince China that it should revalue its renminbi vis-à-
vis the US dollar and because of China’s economic and political weight, the result 
concerning the renminbi may warrant some explanation. First, the modelled utility of 
choosing a given regime relies entirely on long-term structural economic determinants. 
Short-term or political considerations do not play a role. From the model’s perspective, 
however, the case for a floating renminbi is overwhelming. The probability value that 
the estimated utility of a floating renminbi exceeds the utility from a peg to the US 
dollar is 100% in both estimations. These results, however, do not necessarily imply 
that the renminbi is undervalued or needs to be revalued vis-à-vis the US dollar. A 
judgement on the revaluation issue requires a methodological approach different from 
the present one and is discussed inter alia in Cheung et al (2009). 
5.3 Is the US dollar used as an “anchor of last resort”? 
Chapter 2 documents a high degree of fluctuation into and out of the US dollar 
bloc, which is not recorded for the euro bloc. The multitude of cases in which countries 
de-peg from the dollar may be due to the fact that the euro was introduced as late as at 
the start of 1999, whereas the US dollar had already served as an anchor currency for 
several decades. This would be consistent with a long duration between switches from 
one regime to another. Alternatively, there may be a group of countries that switch 
relatively often between regimes and – if they decide to peg their currency – tend to 
choose the US dollar as anchor currency even though their countries’ economic 
structure may not suggest a dollar peg. They may not be able to maintain the dollar peg 
                                                 
13 Note that Zimbabwe took the suggested decision in 2008 as can be seen from Figure 1. The discrepancy 
arises because of a lack of explanatory variables for Zimbabwe in the years after 2005, which causes 
the last observation in the pool to be that of 2005, a year in which the Zimbabwean currency was still 
classified as being pegged to the US dollar.   19
because of a lack of suitability or insufficient preparation, or they may not have planned 
to adhere to the peg for very long right from the outset. In such cases, the function of 
the US dollar may be termed the “anchor of last resort”. 
If the US dollar had been used as an “anchor of last resort” for the subgroup of the 
dollar bloc countries that peg only temporarily to the US dollar, the relevant coefficient 
estimates for the two subgroups should differ significantly from each other. In 
particular, the coefficients for the temporary peggers to the US dollar should be largely 
insignificant in contrast to those of the permanent peggers. Table 3 shows the results for 
two pooled regressions where the US dollar bloc has been split into the two subgroups. 
The subgroup of permanent dollar peggers is composed of those countries that have 
limited the flexibility of their currencies against the US dollar over the entire 
observation period 1999-2008. All the countries that have had a dollar peg at least in 
one year of the sample period, but not in all years, are subsumed into the alternative 
subgroup of temporary dollar peggers.
14 
Column (1) presents results for a regression in which the temporary dollar peggers 
are excluded from the sample. The pool therefore includes all the countries of the three 
other regimes plus the permanent dollar peggers. In column (2), in contrast, the 
permanent dollar peggers are excluded from the sample. It is found that the split into the 
two subgroups yields quite different coefficient estimates and significance levels for the 
explanatory variables of the utility of a dollar peg (vector x2). For the sample that 
includes the permanent dollar peggers, the coefficients for distance to Washington, DC, 
and the share of trade with the dollar bloc countries are significant at a 1% level and 
three times as large as in the alternative sample. The Wald tests show clear evidence of 
net oil exporters favouring a dollar anchor over a euro anchor in the sample that 
includes the permanent dollar peggers, while the evidence for the sample that includes 
the temporary dollar peggers is only weak. 
In sum, there is clear evidence for the hypothesis that structural economic 
variables play an important role in the anchor currency choice of countries that peg 
permanently to the US dollar, whereas these factors are much less important for 
                                                 
14 Klein and Shambaugh (2008, 2010) have already explored the duration of peg spells and the 
repercussions of dividing fixed exchange rate regimes into “long pegs” and “short pegs”. However, 
they did not distinguish between different anchor currencies.   20
countries that peg only temporarily to the US dollar. This supports the idea that 
temporarily pegging countries use the US dollar as their “anchor of last resort”, 
although the significance of the dollar trade share coefficient shows that even for these 
countries’ currency regime choices, OCA criteria are not entirely meaningless. The 
usage as “anchor of last resort” is clearly a currency property that still distinguishes the 
US dollar from the euro. In fact, a comparison of the coefficient estimates for the two 
subsamples in Table 3 and those for the entire pool in Table 1 suggests that the results 
for the subgroup of temporary dollar peggers dominates the results for the entire 
sample. 
A final observation qualifies the preliminary conclusion of section 5.1 that the US 
dollar is used as an anchor currency on a global scale, while the euro is more of regional 
importance as an anchor currency. This conclusion was based on the insignificance of 
the distance parameter for the USA. As column (1) demonstrates, however, distance to 
Washington, DC, is highly significant for the subgroup of permanent dollar peggers. 
The global role of the US dollar as anchor currency, therefore, depends entirely on the 
countries that peg their currencies to the US dollar only temporarily. The different 
geographic extensiveness of the anchor currency status of the US dollar (more global) 
and the euro (more regional) may thus simply derive from the US dollar’s “anchor of 
last resort” function. 
5.4 Checks for endogeneity 
Most of the variables used in the estimation as determinants will hardly be 
affected by exchange rate regime and anchor currency choice, the variable to be 
explained. The trade share, however, might potentially be endogenous to the left-hand 
side variable. On the basis of a corresponding claim in Frankel and Rose (1997), Rose 
(2000) and Frankel and Rose (2002) estimate a large positive effect of the membership 
in a currency union on international trade. This claim has subsequently been challenged, 
inter alia by Persson (2001) and Bun and Klaassen (2007). Turning from currency 
unions to the more general case of exchange rate regime choice, neither Alesina and 
Wagner (2006) nor Levy-Yeyati et al. (2010) find evidence of a causality link from 
trade to regime choice. The evidence in Meissner and Oomes (2009) is inconclusive. 
According to Wolf and Ritschel (2011), trade creation effects found in gravity equations   21
are mostly spurious, and currency bloc arrangements are endogenous to the pre-existing 
pattern of trade. 
As a first tentative control for endogeneity of trade, the pooled nested logit 
regression has been re-performed, now using trade shares that are lagged by one year. 
The estimated coefficients and standard errors, shown in column (1) of Table 4, are 
nearly identical to those of the baseline pooled regression that uses solely 
contemporaneous data (cf. Table  1). While this implies that a current peg does not 
immediately influence trade with countries that belong to the same currency bloc, it may 
be suspected that such effects accumulate gradually over the years or that they occur 
mostly in the first few years after the peg has been introduced. In such cases, the method 
would capture only part of the total effect. 
Therefore, a second check for endogeneity has been performed, in which only that 
observation of a pegging country has been left in the sample that falls in the year in 
which the country introduced the peg. For these observations, the peg cannot have 
enhanced trade within the currency bloc yet, because the country had been floating 
previously. Thus, the trade share must be exogenous to regime choice. The procedure 
implies, of course, that the observations of the countries that have permanently pegged 
their currencies over the entire observation period are eliminated from the sample. Since 
the temporary peggers enter the sample with only one observation (unless they have 
introduced a peg twice or more often within the sample period), only one of the 
observations for the permanently floating countries, that of 2004 in the middle of the 
sample period, has been used as well. In the estimation, the variables “oil export share” 
and “former or present colony of a euro bloc country” have been eliminated from vector 
x1 because none of the countries that introduced a peg to the euro during the observation 
period is a net oil exporter and only one (São Tomé and Príncipe) is a former colony. 
The results of the regressions are shown in columns (2) and (3) of Table  4. 
Column (3) differs from column (2) in that re-pegging countries are eliminated from the 
sample. However, this does not alter the general results. The estimations yield many 
insignificant coefficients. This is due to the fact that many of the natural peggers are 
long-term pegging countries that have been eliminated from the sample. However, the 
coefficient for the share of trade with the euro bloc is very large and also statistically   22
significant. Countries that switched from a float to a peg to the euro already had a 
particularly large share of trade with the euro bloc, a clear sign of the endogeneity of 
regime choice. 
For the US dollar bloc, the situation is estimated to be quite different. The 
coefficient for the trade share with the dollar bloc is small and insignificant. This may 
not come as a surprise because the dollar bloc has already been in existence for decades, 
and countries that engage in intensive trade with the bloc might be expected to have 
already limited the flexibility of their currency vis-à-vis the dollar before the start of the 
sample period. The insignificance further confirms the results on the “anchor of last 
resort” function of the US dollar, according to which many of the countries that have 
recently introduced a dollar peg have no close affinities with the bloc. Apart from that, 
Table 4 suggests that net oil exporters have increasingly pegged their currencies to the 
dollar. 
In sum, the second check for endogeneity suggests that there is some evidence for 
the hypothesis that intensive trade with a given currency bloc is a prerequisite for the 
decision to join the bloc. This is in line with the results of Wolf and Ritschel (2011) 
although it does not, of course, exclude the possibility that a currency anchor further 
enhances trade with the countries of the bloc. 
6. Some illustrative applications to economic policy 
6.1 Currency blocs in equilibrium 
Section 5.2 demonstrated that, according to the estimated model, some countries 
would be able to raise their deterministic utility significantly if they chose to switch 
their exchange rate regime or currency anchor. Now, apply Alesina and Barro’s (2002) 
definition of an equilibrium in currency unions to currency blocs and define a currency 
bloc to be in equilibrium if both the following criteria are fulfilled: (1) None of the 
countries currently in the bloc is able to raise its estimated utility significantly by 
leaving the bloc and (2) none of the countries currently outside of the bloc is able to 
raise its estimated utility significantly by joining the bloc. 
What would be the composition of the two major currency blocs in such an 
equilibrium? The answer to such a question is less trivial than might be thought because 
the equilibrium is not necessarily attained if all the countries for which a significantly   23
suboptimal choice has been computed are simply assumed to adopt the regime that has 
been estimated to provide the highest utility for them. The reason why this would not 
necessarily end up in equilibrium is that the trade share with a given bloc changes by 
definition for most countries and territories in the sample as soon as a country enters or 
leaves the bloc. As elaborated in Meissner and Oomes (2009), the process of pegging or 
de-pegging of one country’s currency exerts a network externality on all the others. If a 
country i adopts a peg to the US dollar, for instance, the utility of a dollar peg rises for 
all the other countries that trade with i because the enlargement of the dollar bloc has 
increased their share of trade with this bloc. 
As a consequence of the described network externalities, any currency bloc 
equilibrium is path-dependent. The current regime and anchor currency choice of a 
country affects the utility of future regime decisions of other countries. On the one hand 
this stabilises currently dominant currency blocs;
15 on the other, it implies that a regime 
switch of a sufficiently large country or group of countries may initiate a cascade of 
further regime changes of the same type. Path-dependency may thus increase the 
probability of equilibria which are corner solutions. If, at the start, some countries are 
assumed to leave a given currency bloc, this may result in an equilibrium where, after a 
self-reinforcing cascade of exits, the bloc is entirely dissolved. If some countries are, 
instead, assumed to join a given bloc, an equilibrium may result where all the countries 
in the world are clustered in this bloc. 
Because of the path-dependency, any calculation of a currency bloc equilibrium, 
as is suggested by the estimated model, depends on the chosen algorithm for regime 
adjustment. This section presents results for the following algorithm where, in the first 
round, the trade shares that are used in the computations are based on the current regime 
and anchor currency choices. 
1) Given the estimation results, equations (8) and (9) as well as Vi4 = 0 are used to 
compute for each country the deterministic utility of having flexible exchange 
rates, adopting the US dollar as anchor currency or pegging the currency to the 
                                                 
15 In this sense, “the dollar has the advantage of incumbency”, as Eichengreen (2011, p 124) puts it.   24
euro.
16 Subsequently, it is determined for each country whether a regime 
different from the one presently in place yields an increase in utility. 
2) If this is the case, Wald tests along the lines of equations (11) – (14) are 
employed to determine whether the utility gain from switching to another regime 
or anchor currency is significantly different from zero. In line with convention, 
significance is evaluated at a 5% level. The results for the first two steps have 
already been applied to current regime choices in section 5.2. 
3) Given the pool of countries selected in step 2, the algorithm identifies that 
country for which the computed p-value is the lowest, ie for which there is the 
highest probability that a change in the exchange rate regime or currency anchor 
would increase utility. 
4) It is assumed that the country selected in step 3 adopts the regime or anchor that 
has been estimated as being the optimal one in terms of utility. 
5) Step 4 has changed the composition of at least one of the currency blocs. Given 
the new currency bloc composition, equation (15) and an equivalent equation for 
the euro bloc have been used, therefore, to calculate trade shares for each 
country with each of the blocs anew. 
6) Based on the new trade shares, the loop re-starts in step 1 by computing 
deterministic utilities for each country. The loop stops if the currency bloc 
equilibrium, as defined above, is reached. 
In short, the basic mechanism of the algorithm is that, in each round, that country 
is assumed to adopt a new regime for which the probability of the regime shift 
increasing the estimated utility is highest among all countries, given that this probability 
is greater than 95%. Tables 5 and 6 show the path to the currency bloc equilibrium that 
the algorithm yields. Table 5 relates to the most recent 2008 regression, while Table 6 is 
based on the regression that uses pooled data for 1999-2008. Therefore, Figure  5 
reflects the situation at the start of the path shown in Table 5 and Figure 6 the situation 
at the start of the path shown in Table 6. 
A comparison of Table  5 and Figure  5 reveals that, in spite of the path-
dependency, each of the countries initially estimated to gain significantly from a change 
                                                 
16 For reasons given in footnote 10, pegs to currencies other than the US dollar and the euro are ignored in 
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away from its 2008 currency regime has adopted the utility-maximising regime in the 
new equilibrium. However, there are three countries for which path-dependency plays a 
role. Their utility gain of switching the currency regime has been raised so much as a 
result of the change in the regime of some other countries that it became significant in 
the course of adjustment to the equilibrium. These countries are Djibouti, for which the 
utility gain of a change from a dollar to a euro peg becomes significant as soon as China 
leaves the US dollar bloc (in round 2),
17 Hungary, for which the utility of a peg to the 
euro significantly exceeds the utility of its present float as soon as the Czech Republic 
enters the euro bloc (round 9), and Serbia, for which the same is true starting with 
Croatia’s adoption of a euro peg (round 10). 
It might have been expected that the impact of a change in the currency bloc 
affiliation of a country as large as China noticeably changes relative utility in more 
countries than just in tiny Djibouti. For the pooled regression (Table 6 and Figure 6), 
this is actually the case. According to the pool estimates, Canada’s and Singapore’s 
utility gains from joining the dollar bloc become insignificant as soon as China starts 
floating the renminbi. At the same time, the utility gain of a switch from a dollar peg to 
floating exchange rates becomes significant for Angola and Jordan. The results show 
that path-dependency’s importance should not be overstated nor can it be ignored. As 
with the 2008 vintage-based estimates, Hungary and Serbia, respectively, are drawn into 
the euro bloc by Croatia’s and the Czech Republic’s adoption of a euro peg. In the pool, 
the same happens to Norway as soon as Sweden joins the euro bloc. 
A currency bloc equilibrium is reached after 17 rounds (Table 5) and after 21 
rounds (Table 6), respectively. The equilibrium is not a corner solution, that is the two 
currency blocs still exist and the number of countries with flexible exchange rates has 
hardly changed. However, the US dollar bloc is smaller in equilibrium than at present. 
In terms of GDP, this is overwhelmingly due to China’s move to flexible exchange 
rates. In contrast to the contraction of the dollar bloc, the euro bloc has grown in the 
course of adjustment to the equilibrium, primarily because further European countries 
                                                 
17 Technically speaking, Djibouti’s p-value of the Wald test on the equality of the two regimes falls below 
the 5% significance level. Note that this does not imply that Djibouti should be the next to switch its 
regime. In fact, the regime switch does not occur until round 15. This is because, after round 2, there 
are still plenty of other countries for which the utility gain from changing their currency regime is still 
higher than Djibouti’s, ie their corresponding p-value is lower than Djibouti’s.   26
have adopted a euro peg. This does not imply, however, that countries have switched 
directly from a dollar peg to a euro peg. Instead, countries that abandoned a dollar peg 
have usually turned to a float while previously floating countries have adopted a euro 
peg. According to both the 2008 and the pool estimates, the US dollar bloc is, in 
equilibrium, 1.2 times as large as the euro bloc as measured in GDP terms. 
If the path towards equilibrium raises utility of some countries significantly, as the 
computations suggest, it might be asked which factors block the adjustment in reality. A 
potentially important factor may be political inertia. If the authorities’ choice of a 
currency regime is based on long-term considerations like those examined here, they 
can expect the regime to remain optimal for many years or even decades, because the 
variables that affect utility of a regime move only slowly. The issue of currency regime 
choice may thus move out of the focus of the authorities’ attention. Another reason for 
the difference between the present pattern of regime choice and the equilibrium may be 
short-term considerations. Countries whose authorities are unable to stabilise inflation 
may need a currency anchor even if long-term considerations suggest this is suboptimal 
(cf the “anchor of last resort” discussion in section 5.3). Capital controls may be able to 
alleviate for some time the disutility from having chosen a suboptimal regime. In this 
context, it should be highlighted that our parsimonious specification of the explanatory 
variables may have ignored further economic or political factors of regime choice, the 
inclusion of which would have changed the equilibrium. 
6.2 Effects of counterfactual economic policy decisions 
An investigation into counterfactual policy decisions requires a baseline scenario 
for comparative purposes. In the present study, two alternatives lend themselves to 
serve as such; first, the estimated utilities computed for the year 2008 situation either 
using the 2008-vintage data or the pool data (cf Figures  5 and 6); second, the two 
corresponding currency bloc equilibria. Below, the equilibria are used as baseline 
scenarios, ie the counterfactuals consider the effect of a policy measure on the path to 
the equilibrium as is shown in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. Technically, the policy 
measure is first introduced, after which the algorithm described in the previous section 
is run until the currency bloc equilibrium is reached. 
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6.2.1 A country deliberately joins one of the currency blocs 
Some of the European Union’s member states have not pegged their currencies to 
the euro, yet. Among these are larger countries, such as the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Sweden and the UK. Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
however, it is assumed that member states will introduce the euro as soon as the 
European Council of Heads of State or of Government decides that they fulfil the 
relevant convergence criteria.
18 In this context, the prospects of joining the monetary 
union are often discussed in these countries. Before being able to introduce the euro, 
countries must have stabilized their currencies vis-à-vis the euro for at least two years. 
Counterfactuals investigate whether the adoption of a peg to the euro by one of these 
countries eventually raises the estimated utility of a peg for another country beyond the 
95% significance level. 
In the baseline scenarios, the Czech Republic joins the euro bloc on the path to the 
equilibrium anyway (cf Tables 5 and 6). The counterfactual of a deliberate adoption of a 
euro peg in the Czech Republic thus amounts to the question of whether the equilibrium 
changes if the Czech Republic is the first country assumed to switch to a new regime. It 
turns out that this is not the case. 
For Poland, Sweden and the UK, the situation in the baseline equilibrium is 
different. In the case of Poland and Sweden, the estimated probability of joining the 
euro bloc is higher than that of any other option including their current float. For the 
UK, the same is true if the equilibrium is based on the pool estimates, but not if it is 
based on 2008 data estimates. Neither for Poland nor for the UK, however, does the 
probability of an increase in utility in the case of an adoption of a euro peg exceed 95%. 
If Sweden is assumed to deliberately peg its currency to the euro, the 2008 data 
estimates suggest that Norway should do so as well. If either Poland or the UK joined 
the euro bloc, both Sweden and Norway should enter a euro peg as well. The 
equilibrium based on the pool estimates, however, is not affected by any of these 
counterfactuals because Sweden and Norway are already part of the euro bloc in this 
baseline equilibrium (cf Table 6). 
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Although there is no corresponding political initiative, the counterfactuals above 
might prompt the question of what happens if one of the NAFTA countries Canada or 
Mexico pegs its currency to the US dollar. It is found that such a step would usually not 
affect the baseline equilibria. As the only exception, the adoption of a dollar peg by 
Mexico alters the equilibrium based on the pool estimates in the sense that Canada joins 
the dollar bloc as well. 
6.2.2 Oil-exporting countries stop using the US dollar as invoice currency 
Currently, the US dollar is used as the invoice currency for oil exports. In recent 
years, there have been discussions in some countries about whether this could or should 
be changed. Until now, a majority of OPEC countries have rejected the idea (cf 
Eichengreen, 2011, p 123). Nevertheless, Khan (2009) reports for the Middle East, 
where many countries peg their currencies to the dollar and, at the same time, are net oil 
exporters, that “there is considerable discussion in the region about reducing the 
dominance of the dollar and increasing the relative importance of the euro” (p 139). In 
an analysis of this issue, Louis et al (2010) find that an anchor to a currency basket may 
be superior to a dollar peg for the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. It may 
therefore be of interest to investigate the repercussions of a counterfactual in which oil-
exporting countries stop using the dollar as the invoice currency. Technically, this has 
been done, first, by setting the parameters of the percentage of oil in total exports and its 
variances and covariances to zero and, then, re-computing the new currency bloc 
equilibrium. 
Since the significance of the net oil export parameters in the baseline estimates is 
weak at best, it might be expected that the counterfactual arrives at virtually the same 
equilibrium as the baseline scenario. Such a conjecture is supported by the results for 
the pooled estimates, where the switch in invoice currency simply raises Azerbaijan’s 
estimated utility gain of de-pegging its currency from the dollar to significant levels. 
Moreover, Chad has chosen to float its currency instead of pegging it to the US dollar in 
the new counterfactual equilibrium. When the 2008 data estimates are used, the 
repercussions of a change in the oil trade invoice currency are more severe. The new 
counterfactual equilibrium differs from the baseline equilibrium by the fact that not only 
Azerbaijan has chosen to de-peg its currency from the dollar and let it float but also   29
Ecuador, Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia. Angola is computed to switch directly from the 
US dollar to the euro bloc. 
6.2.3 Former colonial ties no longer bind 
In the estimations, the parameter of the dummy for former dependency on one of 
the euro bloc countries is highly significant. However, for most countries, several 
decades have passed since they obtained political independence. Network effects will 
have played a role in maintaining ties between former colony and colonial power. The 
counterfactual of this section assumes that these ties no longer bind. Technically, a new 
equilibrium is computed much like in the previous section after having set the parameter 
and covariances of the colony dummy to zero. In the resulting counterfactual 
equilibrium, nearly all the African countries that presently peg their currencies to the 
euro have left the euro bloc.
19 Most of these countries have adopted a regime of flexible 
exchange rates. The Republic of the Congo and Gabon, both of which are net oil 
exporters, have switched directly from a euro peg to a dollar peg. 
6.2.4 The potential of China’s renminbi to serve as the core of a third major 
currency bloc 
The rapidly rising importance of China in the global economy has sparked 
discussions on a bigger international role for the Chinese currency, the renminbi. The 
Chinese authorities themselves have contributed to the discussion. In March 2009, for 
instance, Governor Zhou of the People’s Bank of China gave a speech, in which he 
proposed a reform of the international monetary system. Eichengreen (2011, pp 144-
145) cites inter alia “China’s currency swap agreements ... as a way for it to signal its 
ambitions”. This suggests exploring the potential of the renminbi to become the anchor 
currency for a group of countries and, thus, the core of a new currency bloc. As before, 
the counterfactual focuses on whether the economic structure of the country considered 
is conducive to a renminbi peg. For the renminbi to become an anchor currency at all, 
however, additional adjustments on the part of the Chinese authorities would obviously 
be necessary, notably the establishment of renminbi convertibility. 
For a world with three, rather than two currency blocs, the model requires some 
slight adjustments. The decision tree in Figure 4 is expanded by adding a fourth branch 
                                                 
19 The only exceptions are Equatorial Guinea and the island states of Cape Verde and São Tomé and 
Príncipe. The result is independent of the estimates used for their calculation.   30
called “peg to the renminbi” for the category “anchor currency choice”. The 
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and the inclusive value defined in equation (5) is replaced for (1) – (4) and (17) by 
  () () () [] τ τ τ / exp / exp / exp 1 ln 5 5 2 2 1 1 β x β x β x ′ + ′ + ′ + = I , (18) 
where  x5 denotes the vector of explanatory variables for choosing the renminbi as 
anchor currency, β5 is the corresponding parameter vector and pi5 is the probability for 
country i of choosing a renminbi peg. 
The set of explanatory variables included in vector x5 is compiled along the lines 
of those of vectors x1 and x2. Vector x5 thus includes for each country its share of net oil 
exports in total exports, the great circle distance between its capital and Beijing, its trade 
with China as a percentage of total trade, and a colony dummy which is set to 1 for 
Hong Kong and 0 elsewhere. Since a counterfactual is considered, the parameters in 
vector  β5 cannot be estimated, but must be imposed instead. Below, results of a 
counterfactual are presented, in which the estimated parameters for the euro bloc are 
imposed on China,  1 5 β β ˆ = . Modelling the renminbi analogously to the euro might be 
rather plausible because the Chinese currency would be in a situation similar to that of 
the euro, a contender for the role of the incumbent, the US dollar. Alternatively, the 
renminbi could have been parameterised along the lines of the dollar, imposing the 
estimated distance and trade share parameters for the dollar bloc on β5. It turned out, 
however, that both exercises yield very similar results, which, of course, is a signal of 
their robustness. 
The present counterfactual also requires a modification of the algorithm that 
determines the currency bloc equilibrium. This is necessary because there are no 
compelling values available that could be imposed on the covariances between the 
parameters in β5 and the other parameters of the model. This implies that the covariance 
matrix  Σ ˆ  in equation (13) cannot be determined and, consequently, a Wald test cannot 
be performed. In the previous exercises, however, the algorithm assumed that a country 
switches its currency regime only if the Wald test indicates at least a 95% probability   31
that the switch will raise the country’s utility. Since the application of the Wald test is 
impossible in the present counterfactual, the algorithm has been adjusted to allow a 
switch of the currency regime as long as the probability of country i choosing an 
alternative regime (ie pegging its currency to the renminbi) is higher than the 
probability of keeping its current currency regime. Note that this is a much looser 
condition than the one used so far. An equilibrium might therefore be expected where a 
relatively large group of countries has joined the renminbi bloc. 
However, in spite of the lower hurdle, results suggest the opposite. Irrespective of 
whether the pool estimates or the 2008 data estimates are used, the only economy that 
has pegged its currency to the renminbi in the counterfactual equilibrium is Hong Kong. 
How does the prospect of a continuation of the increase in trade between China and its 
partners relative to trade in the rest of the world affect this result? In order to assess this 
question, exports and imports of China have been progressively multiplied, while the 
trade of the rest of the world has been kept constant. It turns out that, apart from Hong 
Kong, only Mongolia and the Solomon Islands have joined the renminbi bloc in a new 
equilibrium, even if the trade of China has been assumed to rise to five times its 2008 
magnitude relative to the rest of the world. Again, this result is independent of the set of 
estimates used in the calculations. In sum, the counterfactuals suggest that, first, the 
present potential for a renminbi currency bloc is very small, even if convertibility of the 
renminbi were to be established, and second, that China still has a long way to go before 
the renminbi obtains the potential to rival the US dollar as an anchor currency. 
7. Conclusions 
In the introduction, three sets of questions on currency blocs were posed that have 
been tackled successively in the study. The first of these questions simply asked for a 
description of presently existing currency blocs. It turned out that, in terms of anchor 
currency status, Eichengreen’s (2011) prospect of a world of multiple international 
currencies has already been attained. At present, two major currency blocs, the US 
dollar bloc and the euro bloc, coexist with numerous floating currencies. The number of 
countries and territories that belong to each of the two blocs was the same in 2008. In 
terms of combined GDP measured in purchasing power parities, the US dollar bloc is 
around double the size of the euro bloc. This changes considerably, however, as soon as   32
China de-pegs its currency from the dollar. In contrast to the euro bloc, there is a high 
degree of fluctuation into and out of the dollar bloc. 
The second set of questions was centred on the determinants of anchor currency 
choice and the distinctive features of the two currency blocs. The results of a nested 
logit regression suggest that long-term structural economic variables significantly 
explain the choice between a floating and a fixed exchange rate regime and, at the same 
time, the anchor currency choice once a country opted for a peg. Trade integration plays 
a major role in a country’s anchor currency choice in both the dollar bloc and the euro 
bloc. The distance to the location of the central monetary authority of the two blocs, 
Washington, DC, and Frankfurt am Main, respectively, is a significant factor for anchor 
currency choice with regard to the euro bloc, but not the dollar bloc. This might imply 
that the US dollar is of global importance as an anchor currency and that the euro is not. 
Separate regressions qualify such a conclusion, however, by showing that this outcome 
is due entirely to a group of countries that peg their currencies only temporarily to the 
US dollar. 
Addressing the third set of questions, the study computes a currency bloc 
equilibrium in the spirit of Alesina and Barro (2002). It is found that, in equilibrium, the 
US dollar bloc is smaller and the euro bloc larger than at present. The equilibrium is 
characterised by several Asian and African countries having de-pegged from the US 
dollar and additional European countries having adopted a fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis 
the euro. In spite of quite substantial differences in the methodological approach, the 
results are close to those of Alesina et al (2002). Moreover, the calculations suggest 
that, structurally, the potential for the formation of a renminbi bloc is low. If the 
estimated structural relations for the euro or the dollar bloc can be taken as a guide, the 
establishment of convertibility of the renminbi will be only a first step in this direction. 
The question remains as to whether the estimated path to the currency bloc 
equilibrium provides a glimpse into the future. This may be the case if the reason for the 
deviations of the equilibrium from the present situation is the slow adjustment of 
currency regimes. Alternatively, factors that have not been included in the analysis 
could inhibit any adjustment. Concerning the relative weight of the two large currency 
blocs, two such factors are currently under discussion. Eichengreen (2011, p 130) puts   33
forward the idea that an expansion of the international role of the euro is being slowed 
down by the fact that the euro is a currency without a unified state. As a second reason 
against a further rise of the euro, Posen (2008, 2009) picks up a point made by Strange 
(1980), claiming that a lack of military power is preventing a further expansion of the 
euro area.   34
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Afghanistan  AF  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Albania  AL  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Algeria  DZ  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
American  Samoa*  AS  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Andorra*  AD  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Angola  AO  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 
Anguilla*  AI  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Antigua  Barbuda  AG  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Argentina  AR  2 2 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 
Armenia  AM  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Aruba  AW  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Australia  AU  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Austria  AT  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Azerbaijan  AZ  4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 2 
Bahamas  BS  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Bahrain  BH  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Bangladesh  BD  3 3 2 2 4 4 4 4 2 2 
Barbados  BB  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Belarus  BY  4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 3 
Belgium  BE  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Belize  BZ  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Benin  BJ  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bermuda*  BM  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 























































Bolivia  BO  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  BA  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Botswana  BW  3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
Brazil  BR  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
British  Virgin  Islands*  VG  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Brunei  BN  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Bulgaria  BG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Burkina  Faso  BF  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Burundi  BI  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Cambodia  KH  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Cameroon  CM  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Canada  CA  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Cape  Verde  CV  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Cayman  Islands*  KY  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Central  African  Republic  CF  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Chad  TD  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Channel  Islands*  JE  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Chile  CL  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
China  CN  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 
China  (Taiwan)*  TW  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Colombia  CO  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Comoros  KM  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Congo,  Democratic  Republic  ZR  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Congo,  Republic  CG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Cook  Islands*  CK  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Costa  Rica  CR  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 























































Croatia  HR  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 4 
Cuba*  CU  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Cyprus  CY  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Czech  Republic  CZ  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Denmark  DK  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Djibouti  DJ  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Dominica  DM  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Dominican  Republic  DO  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Ecuador  EC  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Egypt  EG  2 2 2 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 
El  Salvador  SV  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Equatorial  Guinea  GQ  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Eritrea  ER  4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Estonia  EE  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Ethiopia  ET  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 
Falkland  Islands*  FK  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Faroe  Islands*  FO  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Fiji  FJ  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Finland  FI  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
France  FR  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
French  Guiana*  GF  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
French  Polynesia*  PF  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Gabon  GA  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Gambia  GM  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Georgia  GE  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Ghana  GH  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 























































Greece  GR  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Greenland*  GL  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Grenada  GD  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Guadeloupe*  GP  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Guam*  GU  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Guatemala  GT  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Guinea  GN  4 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
Guinea-Bissau  GW  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Guyana  GY  4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 
Haiti  HT  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Honduras  HN  4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 
Hong  Kong  HK  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Hungary  HU  4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 
Iceland  IS  3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
India  IN  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Indonesia  ID  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Iran  IR  2 2 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 
Iraq  IQ  2 2 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 
Ireland  IE  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Isle  of  Man*  IM  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Israel  IL  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Italy  IT  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Jamaica  JM  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Japan  JP  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Jordan  JO  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Kazakhstan  KZ  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 























































Kiribati  KI  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Korea,  DPR*  KP  2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Korea,  Republic  KR  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Kuwait  KW  3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 
Kyrgyz  Republic  KG  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Laos  LA  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Latvia  LV  3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
Lebanon  LB  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Lesotho  LS  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Liberia  LR  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Libya  LY  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Liechtenstein*  LI  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Lithuania  LT  2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Luxembourg  LU  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Macao*  MO  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Macedonia  MK  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Madagascar  MG  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Malawi  MW  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 
Malaysia  MY  2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 
Maldives  MV  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Mali  ML  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Malta  MT  3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
Marshall  Islands  MH  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Martinique*  MQ  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Mauritania  MR  4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 
Mauritius  MU  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 























































Mexico  MX  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Micronesia  FM  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Moldova  MD  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Monaco*  MC  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Mongolia  MN  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 
Montenegro  ME        1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Montserrat*  MS  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Morocco  MA  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Mozambique  MZ  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Myanmar  MM  3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Namibia  NA  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Nauru*  NR  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Nepal  NP  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Netherlands  NL  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Netherlands  Antilles  AN  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
New  Caledonia*  NC  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
New  Zealand  NZ  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Nicaragua  NI  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Niger  NE  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Nigeria  NG  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 
Niue*  NU  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Northern  Mariana  Islands*  MP  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Norway  NO  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Oman  OM  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Pakistan  PK  2 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 
Palau  PW  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 























































Papua  New  Guinea  PG  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Paraguay  PY  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Peru  PE  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Philippines  PH  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Pitcairn  Islands*  PN  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Poland  PL  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Portugal  PT  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Puerto  Rico*  PR  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Qatar  QA  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Réunion*  RE  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Romania  RO  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Russia  RU  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 
Rwanda  RW  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 
St  Helena*  SH  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
St  Kitts  and  Nevis  KN  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
St  Lucia  LC  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
St  Martin  and  St  Barthélemy*    1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
St  Pierre  and  Miquelon*  PM  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
St Vincent and the Grenadines  VC  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Samoa  WS  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
San  Marino  SM  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
São  Tomé  and  Príncipe  ST  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 
Saudi  Arabia  SA  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Senegal  SN  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Serbia  RS        4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Seychelles  SC  3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 4 























































Singapore  SG  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Slovak  Republic  SK  4 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 
Slovenia  SI  4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Solomon  Islands  SB  3 3 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 4 
Somalia  SO  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
South  Africa  ZA  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Spain  ES  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sri  Lanka  LK  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 
Sudan  SD  4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Suriname  SR  4 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 
Swaziland  SZ  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Sweden  SE  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Switzerland  CH  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Syria  SY  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 
Tajikistan  TJ  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 
Tanzania  TZ  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Thailand  TH  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Timor-Leste  TL        2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Togo  TG  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Tokelau*  TK  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Tonga  TO  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Trinidad  and  Tobago  TT  2 2 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
Tunisia  TN  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 
Turkey  TR  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Turkmenistan  TM  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Turks  and  Caicos  Islands*  TC  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 























































Uganda  UG  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Ukraine  UA  4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 
United  Arab  Emirates  AE  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
United  Kingdom  GB  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Uruguay  UY  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
US  Virgin  Islands*  VI  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Uzbekistan  UZ  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 
Vanuatu  VU  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 
Venezuela  VE  4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Vietnam  VN  2 2 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 4 
Wallis  and  Futuna*  WF  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Yemen  YE  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 
Yugoslavia  YU    4  4         
Zambia  ZM  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Zimbabwe  ZW  2 4 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 4 
Notes: 
The numbers 1 to 3 indicate that the country’s exchange rate regime is a peg which includes the IMF 
categories “no separate legal tender”, “currency board”, “conventional peg”, “stabilized arrangement”, 
and “pegged exchange rate within horizontal bands”. The number 1 indicates a country that belongs to 
the euro bloc and comprises the IMF categories “country participates in the euro area”, “country 
participates in ERM II”, and “flexibility is limited vis-à-vis the euro”. The number 2 denotes a country 
belonging to the US dollar bloc (IMF category “flexibility is limited vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar”). The 
number 3 denotes a peg to another currency or basket and comprises the IMF categories “flexibility is 
limited vis-à-vis another single currency”, “flexibility is limited vis-à-vis the SDR”, and “flexibility is 
limited vis-à-vis another basket of currencies”. The number 4 indicates that the country’s exchange rate 
is flexible in a broad sense; it comprises the IMF categories “free floating” (except countries participating 
in the euro area), “floating”, “other managed arrangement”, “crawl-like arrangement”, and “crawling 
peg”. Usually, the data are taken from the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions. Data from year t’s volume often refer to the end of the previous year t-1, and are therefore 
generally assigned to t-1. A star * indicates that the IMF does not provide data on the country or territory 
in question; in these cases, the data are taken from various issues of Deutsche Bundesbank, Exchange 
Rate Statistics, Statistical Supplement to the Monthly Report 5. This source has also been used in 
instances where the IMF’s data were inconclusive, for example, if the exchange rate regime was classified 
but no information on the anchor currency was given. The USA and Germany being effectively the 
economies to which the other members of the US dollar bloc and the euro bloc, respectively, have pegged 
their currencies, are not included in the Table. 
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Appendix 2: Data sources for explanatory variables 
Each of the following data have been used for all countries and territories 
available. 
Real GDP: Series “GDP, PPP (constant 2005 international $)”; annual data; 
source: World Bank, WDI 2010. 
Real per capita GDP: Series “GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international 
$)”; annual data; source: WDI 2010. 
Trade openness: Series “Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)” plus series 
“Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)”; annual data; source: WDI 2010. 
Population: Series “Population, total”; annual data; source: WDI 2010. 
Trade with the US dollar (euro) bloc as a fraction of total trade: For each year, two full 
DOTS cross-country matrices have been downloaded, one showing the exports of each 
country to all destination countries, and the other showing the (c.i.f.) imports of each 
country from all origin countries; annual data; source: IMF, DOTS 2010. 
Distance: Great circle distance between a given country’s capital and Washington, 
DC, Frankfurt am Main or Beijing measured in kilometres as computed on the website 
http://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/distance.html. 
Share of net oil exports in total exports: Series “Oil trade balance”, W...TBO, 
divided by series “Value of exports of goods & services”, W...TX; annual data; source: 
IMF, WEO 2010. 
Dummy for present or former euro bloc colony: CIA, World Fact Book, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html. 
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Appendix 3: Nested logit model for exchange rate regime and anchor currency 
choice: results for the years 2000-2007 
    2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 


















































































































































τ  0.29 0.31 0.35 0.22 0.25 0.19 0.30 0.29 
p(τ = 1)  0.004 0.006 0.004  0.0002  0.001 0.0004 0.002  0.002 
p(oil(x1) = oil(x2))  0.61 0.79 0.95 0.07 0.21 0.32 0.09 0.06 
N1  (peg  EUR)  40 40 40 38 36 35 35 33 
N2  (peg  USD)  39 43 39 28 29 31 27 30 
N3  (peg  other)  11 10  8  8  11 11 12 14 
N4  (float)  74 72 80 90 88 87 89 85 
Variables and coefficients as defined in chapters 3 and 4; z-values in parenthesis; *** significant at 1% 
level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. “p(τ = 1)” gives p-values of an LR test on τ = 
1; “p(oil(x1) = oil(x2))” gives p-values of a Wald test on the equality of the two oil export parameters, the 
one in the US dollar bloc and the one in the euro bloc equation.   48
Table 1: Nested logit model for exchange rate regime and anchor currency choice 
   2008  1999  Pool 






















































τ  0.487 0.249 0.326 
p(τ = 1)  0.029 0.0007   
p(oil(x1) = oil(x2)) 0.056  0.069  0.293 
N1 (peg EUR)  39  33  369 
N2 (peg USD)  29  30  325 
N3 (peg other)  8  15  108 
N4 (float)  81  82  828 
Variables and coefficients as defined in chapters 3 and 4; z-values in parenthesis; *** significant at 1% 
level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. “Pool” = data for 1999-2008 is pooled; in the 
pooled estimation, computation of robust standard errors is based on country clusters; “p(τ = 1)” gives p-
values of an LR test on τ = 1; “p(oil(x1) = oil(x2))” gives p-values of a Wald test on the equality of the 
two oil export parameters, the one in the US dollar bloc and the one in the euro bloc equation. Results for 
the years 2000-2007 are shown in Appendix 3.   49
Table 2: Estimated average marginal effects on the probability of choosing a given 
exchange rate regime or anchor currency; percentage points 
   2008  1999  Pool 
GDP  peg EUR (pi1) -2.41 -2.21 -2.40 
(increase by 1 %)  peg USD (pi2) -2.94 -2.69 -3.01 
  peg other (pi3) -0.94 -1.28 -1.02 
 float  (pi4)  6.28 6.19 6.43 
GDP per capita  peg EUR (pi1) 5.56 5.71 6.00 
(increase by 1 %)  peg USD (pi2) 6.79 6.94 7.52 
  peg other (pi3) 2.17 3.31 2.56 
 float  (pi4)  -14.52 -15.96 -16.08 
Distance(Frankfurt)  peg EUR (pi1) -2.51 -2.63 -2.42 
(increase by 1 %)  peg USD (pi2) 0.62 0.74 0.73 
  peg other (pi3) 0.34 0.76 0.49 
 float  (pi4)  1.56 1.13 1.20 
Distance(Washington)  peg EUR (pi1) 0.10 0.12 0.09 
(increase by 1 %)  peg USD (pi2) -0.52 -0.72 -0.45 
  peg other (pi3) 0.13 0.38 0.18 
 float  (pi4)  0.29 0.22 0.18 
Oil export share  peg EUR (pi1) -0.04 -0.17 -0.08 
(increase by 1 PP)  peg USD (pi2) 0.23 0.08 0.07 
  peg other (pi3) -0.06 0.03  0 
 float  (pi4) -0.13  0.06  0.02 
Trade(EUR) share  peg EUR (pi1) 0.60 0.48 0.51 
(increase by 1 PP)  peg USD (pi2) -0.15 -0.14 -0.16 
  peg other (pi3) -0.08 -0.14 -0.10 
 float  (pi4) -0.37  -0.21 -0.25 
Trade(USD) share  peg EUR (pi1) -0.07 -0.06 -0.08 
(increase by 1 PP)  peg USD (pi2) 0.39 0.38 0.41 
  peg other (pi3) -0.10 -0.20 -0.16 
 float  (pi4) -0.22  -0.12 -0.17 
Colony (EUR)  peg EUR (pi1)  44.57 35.96 33.68 
(“colony” instead of  peg USD (pi2)  -13.42 -12.49 -12.13 
“no colony”)  peg other (pi3) -4.52 -7.52 -5.19 
 float  (pi4)  -26.62 -15.96 -16.35 
“Pool” = data for 1999-2008 is pooled; PP = percentage point.   50
Table 3: Nested logit model for exchange rate regime and anchor currency choice: 
US dollar as “anchor of last resort”? 
   (1)  (2) 




































τ  0.405 0.360 
p(oil(x1) = oil(x2)) 0.023  0.065 
N1 (peg EUR)  361  369 
N2 (peg USD)  176  149 
N3 (peg other)  90  108 
N4 (float)  609  828 
Variables and coefficients as defined in chapters 3 and 4; z-values in parenthesis; *** significant at 1% 
level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. Computation of robust standard errors is 
based on country clusters; “p(oil(x1) = oil(x2))” gives p-values of a Wald test on the equality of the two oil 
export parameters, the one in the US dollar bloc and the one in the euro bloc equation. (1) excludes from 
the sample all those countries that pegged only temporarily to the US dollar. (2) excludes from the sample 
all those countries that pegged permanently to the US dollar.   51
Table 4: Nested logit model for exchange rate regime and anchor currency choice: 
Check for endogeneity of explanatory variables 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 






















































τ  0.326 1.45  2.36 
p(oil(x1) = oil(x2)) 0.281     
N1 (peg EUR)  368  5  5 
N2 (peg USD)  325  33  22 
N3 (peg other)  108  3  3 
N4 (float)  828  55  55 
Variables and coefficients as defined in chapters 3 and 4; z-values in parenthesis; *** significant at 1% 
level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level; in model (1), computation of robust standard 
errors is based on country clusters; “p(oil(x1) = oil(x2))” gives p-values of a Wald test on the equality of 
the two oil export parameters, the one in the US dollar bloc and the one in the euro bloc equation. (1) 
Pooled estimation, trade shares lagged by 1 year. (2) Sample restricted to permanent floaters in 2004 and 
countries that have just switched from a float to a peg. (3) as (2) but re-pegging countries excluded from 
the sample.   52
Table 5: The path to a currency bloc equilibrium based on the estimates for 2008 
Round  Country  Current regime  New regime  p-value in % 
1 Malawi  peg(USD)  float  0.0002 
2 China  peg(USD)  float  0.0002 
3 Bangladesh  peg(USD)  float  0.0002 
4 Yemen  peg(USD)  float  0.03 
5 Jordan  peg(USD)  float  0.09 
6 Switzerland  float  peg(EUR)  0.16 
7 Iceland  float  peg(EUR)  0.36 
8 Suriname  peg(USD)  peg(EUR)  0.35 
9 Czech  Republic  float  peg(EUR)  0.52 
10 Croatia  float  peg(EUR)  0.45 
11 Albania  float  peg(EUR)  1.05 
12 Lebanon  peg(USD)  float  1.71 
13 Algeria  float  peg(EUR)  1.97 
14 Turkmenistan  peg(USD)  float  2.15 
15 Djibouti  peg(USD)  peg(EUR)  2.82 
16 Hungary  float  peg(EUR)  2.86 
17 Serbia  float  peg(EUR)  1.26 
The path to the equilibrium is computed according to the algorithm described in section 6.1. The “new 
regime” is the regime that has been estimated as providing the highest deterministic utility based on a 
currency bloc constellation as given in the corresponding round of the algorithm. The p-value refers to a 
country-specific Wald test on the equality of the estimated deterministic utilities of the current and the 
“new” regimes. Only those cases are considered in which the estimated deterministic utility of the new 
regime is higher than that of the current regime.   53
Table 6: The path to a currency bloc equilibrium based on the estimates for the 
pool 
Round  Country  Current regime  New regime  p-value in % 
1 Zimbabwe  peg(USD)  float  0.00003 
2 Malawi  peg(USD)  float  0.00009 
3 Bangladesh  peg(USD)  float  0.0001 
4 China  peg(USD)  float  0.0003 
5 Yemen  peg(USD)  float  0.0002 
6 Switzerland  float  peg(EUR)  0.04 
7 Iceland  float  peg(EUR)  0.03 
8 Seychelles  float  peg(USD)  0.18 
9 Kazakhstan  peg(USD)  float  0.19 
10 Croatia  float  peg(EUR)  0.31 
11 Czech  Republic  float  peg(EUR)  0.30 
12 Turkmenistan  peg(USD)  float  0.31 
13 Chad  peg(EUR)  float  1.46 
14 Albania  float  peg(EUR)  1.63 
15 Hungary  float  peg(EUR)  1.76 
16 Sweden  float  peg(EUR)  1.82 
17 Norway  float  peg(EUR)  0.96 
18 Angola  peg(USD)  float  1.90 
19 Serbia  float  peg(EUR)  2.14 
20 Jordan  peg(USD)  float  2.90 
21 Jamaica  float  peg(USD)  3.90 
The path to the equilibrium is computed according to the algorithm described in section 6.1. The “new 
regime” is the regime that has been estimated as providing the highest deterministic utility based on a 
currency bloc constellation as given in the corresponding round of the algorithm. The p-value refers to a 
country-specific Wald test on the equality of the estimated deterministic utilities of the current and the 
“new” regimes. Only those cases are considered in which the estimated deterministic utility of the new 
regime is higher than that of the current regime. Concerning the result for Zimbabwe in round 1, cf 
footnote 12 in section 5.2. 
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Figure 1: Map of the two major currency blocs in 2008 
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Figure 2: Map of the two major currency blocs in 2008, Europe 
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Figure 3: Map of the two major currency blocs in 2008, West Indies 
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Figure 5: Probabilities of choosing regime options as estimated for 2008 
 




















Current regime:  59
Figure 6: Probabilities of choosing regime options as estimated using pooled data 
for 1999 – 2008; most recent observation available 
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